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Abstract:  
Western governments increasingly encourage Muslims to challenge Islamist extremism. However, 
the dominant academic and public discourse regards Muslims as deeply alienated and thus reluctant 
to do so. The article investigates motivations for Muslim counter-extremism engagement and based 
on that formulates policy recommendations that are useful to government agencies that seek to 
mobilize Muslim communities to fight Islamist extremism. The analysis finds that Muslims are more 
likely to mobilize if governments highlight how Islamist extremism violates Islamic and universal 
values, how it negatively affects particular sections of Muslim communities and how it can be 
successfully tackled by Muslim-based action.  
 
Keywords: counter-extremism, Muslims, motivations, activism, collective action theory 
 
Funding details:  
This research was partly funded by an Aarhus University Research Foundation Starting Grant (grant 
ID: AUFF-E-2015-FLS-8-3) rewarded to associate professor Lasse Lindekilde. 
 
Discloser statement: There is no potential conflict of interest on the side of the author. 
 
Acknowledgment: The author thanks Lasse Lindekilde, Thomas Olesen and the two anonymous 
reviewers for their valuable suggestions.  
2 
 
Introduction 
Modern counter-extremism approaches put a premium on active engagement of civil society, be it 
ordinary citizens, family members, friends, non-governmental organizations or entire communities.1 
In this “civilianization” of counter-terrorism policies,2 citizens become co-producers of security.3 In 
particular, Muslim communities in the West are “responsibilised” and “mobilized” to take a role in 
countering Islamist extremism.4 
However, academic research has described Muslims as being deeply alienated by counter-
terrorism and counter-extremism policies, which are thought to compound the negative effects of 
widespread anti-Muslim discrimination, anxieties and hatred.5 Manifested in suspicion, fear and 
distrust of the authorities, alienation is thought to limit the willingness of Muslims to engage in 
counter-extremism.6 Those Muslims who do engage and receive government support in their efforts 
are often labelled as “sell-outs” and viewed with suspicion.7 Public discourse on the issue also seems 
to lean towards the idea that Muslims are not active enough when it comes to challenging Islamist 
extremism.8  
Yet, the media also report on Muslims participating in one-off collective actions against Islamist 
extremism (e.g., demonstrations or petitions) in response to particular events and on Muslim activists 
engaged in long-term counter-extremism efforts.9 This indicates that at least some sections of Muslim 
communities are either not alienated or are willing to overcome their alienation when it comes to 
taking action against Islamist extremism. Either way, if Western governments want to encourage 
more Muslims to challenge Islamist extremism, it is important to study the motivation of both one-
off and long-term Muslim activists. Finding out what motivates Muslims to stand up and act against 
Islamist extremism would help to focus government agencies’ and civil society organizations’ 
mobilizing efforts and avoid alienation. Indirectly, such investigations will help make counter-
terrorism policies more effective. 
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The objective of this article is thus to investigate motivations of Muslims to engage in counter-
extremism in spite of widespread alienation and based on this to formulate policy recommendations 
for government agencies or civil society organizations that seek to mobilize Muslim communities for 
the fight against Islamist extremism and terrorism. The study focuses on the case of British Muslims, 
because the British context represents a case with a sizeable Muslim minority, a history of Muslim 
homegrown terrorism and long-standing policies centered on encouraging Muslim communities to 
co-produce in counter-terrorism.10 Thus, in the UK we find Muslims engaged in the fight against 
Islamist extremism, despite an alledged high degree of Muslim alianation in regards to counter-
terrorism. 
The theoretical framework of this study borrows from van Zomeren’s11 review of social-
psychological theories of motivations for collective action, which identifies four core motivations for 
engaging in activism: identity, efficacy, emotions and morality. The predictive power of these 
motivations in the case of Muslim counter-extremism engagement is tested with the use of an original 
survey of British Muslims (n = 825). This deductive approach is complemented by an analysis of an 
open-ended question about motivation for action against Islamist extremism, which is included in the 
survey, as well as semi-structured interviews with British Muslim counter-extremism activists (n = 
30). The interviews shed light on the motivations of long-term counter-extremism activists and 
whether these motivations are similar to the ones driving one-off action.  
The article proceeds as follows. First, based on van Zomeren’s outlined motivational framework, 
I derive five hypotheses about British Muslims’ motivation to counter-extremism. Next, I describe 
the collection of the survey data and the interviews, the key variables and controls used in the analysis 
of the survey data and the coding procedure for the analysis of the interview data. Then, I present and 
discuss the results structured along four main motivations: identity, efficacy, emotions and morality. 
I conclude by discussing the policy implications of the findings.   
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Motivations for counter-extremism  
In the absence of a theory that deals specifically with motivations for engagement in counter-
extremism, this study draws on recent insights from social-psychological theories of motivation for 
collective action. According to the definition of collective action by Wright et al., “[a] group member 
engages in collective action any time that he or she is acting as a representative of the group and 
where the action is directed at improving the conditions of the group as a whole”.12 This definition 
has been extended to include other goals than improving the condition of one’s group.13 It could be 
argued that Islamist terrorism and extremism, apart from directly victimizing Muslims, contributes to 
anti-Muslim anxiety, prejudice and discrimination, which puts entire Muslim communities under 
pressure and leaves them in a disadvantaged position. Therefore, a Muslim who takes an action 
against Islamist extremism can be seen as improving the condition and the status of Muslims as a 
group.  
Collective action can be collective in form (e.g., a demonstration), but it can also be individualistic 
in form (e.g., a petition), as long as the individual action is linked to a larger group of people on whose 
behalf or for whose sake it is being done. In this light, a Muslim who engages another Muslim in a 
private discussion with the aim of dissuading him or her from extremist ideas can be regarded as 
engaged in a form of collective action, assuming the engagement is being done on behalf of or for the 
sake of other Muslims.  
There is a heterogeneity of approaches to understanding motivations for collective action. Some 
are rooted in rational choice theory, some in social identity theory and others in emotions. In his 
review of existing approaches and theories, van Zomeren14 identified four recurrent motivations for 
taking collective action: identity, efficacy, emotions and morality.  
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The concept of identity motivation derives from social identity theory,15 which asserts that people 
understand themselves in terms of social categories and group memberships. On the group level, 
members share a collective identity that defines what the group is about and feeds back to the 
individual’s social identity, which defines what the individual is about.16 Group identification is the 
link between social identity and collective identity.17 The strength of group identification influences 
how much we are prepared to act on behalf or for the sake of our group, for example to enhance or 
protect its status.18 If one strongly identifies with women as a group, one will be more likely to 
participate in collective protest activities against a law that is harmful to women’s interest.19 By 
extension, assuming that Islamist extremism is harmful to Muslims in both direct (e.g., as victims of 
terrorist attacks) and indirect (e.g., as victims of anti-Muslim anxieties) ways, I formulate the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H1a: The stronger British Muslims identify as Muslims, the more likely they are to take action against 
Islamist extremism. 
 
Research has also shown that a specific identification beyond a broad and “objective” social 
category (such as sex) can have even more predictive power. For example, identifying with a specific 
feminist organization, movement, or activist identity would be a better predictor of collective action 
than identification with women in general.20 This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H1b: The stronger British Muslims identify with counter-extremism activists, the more likely they are 
to take action against Islamist extremism. 
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Political and social actions are goal-directed, meaning there is usually an explicit or implicit 
desirable outcome envisaged behind them, whose realization motivates people to action. More 
precisely, people are motivated by the perception that the realization of these goals is actually 
achievable, i.e. they have to feel efficacious. Hornsey et al.21 suggested that besides the ultimate or 
formal goal of a particular collective action (e.g., reducing extremism), there are other goals, whose 
fulfilment can draw people into action, like influencing a third party (e.g., the media or the non-
Muslim part of the society) or attracting more activists to the cause. In this article, I focus on group 
efficacy, which is the belief that the group effort (not just the individual contribution) will bring about 
the desired goals. Building on this, I hypothesize the following: 
 
H2: The more British Muslims believe that their group effort can make a difference, the more likely 
they are to take action against Islamist extremism. 
 
In the past, scholars like Le Bon or Freud regarded emotions as irrational and potentially 
destructive aspect of collective action. Contemporary researchers consider emotions as a coping 
reaction based on a rational cognitive appraisal of one’s situation.22 Emotions therefore are 
“associated with states of action readiness that prepare individuals for adaptive action”.23 There has 
been a special emphasis on the role of anger, which is thought to be the most potent predictor of 
political action because it is an approach oriented emotion that encourages action, rather than 
withdrawal.24 This leads to the next hypothesis: 
 
H3: The more anger British Muslims feel against Islamist extremists, the more likely they are to take 
action against Islamist extremism. 
 
7 
 
People can also take action in response to the violation of their strongly held norms and values.25 
An inner moral obligation to act26 develops from the need to protect moral convictions,27 which are 
defined as “strong and absolute stances on moralized issues”.28 Absolute stances on moralized issues 
are also referred to as “sacred values”, understood as “any value that a moral community implicitly 
or explicitly treats as possessing infinite or transcendental significance that precludes comparisons, 
trade-offs, or indeed any other mingling with bounded or secular values”.29 Therefore, the final 
hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H4: The more British Muslims feel that it is their moral obligation to act against Islamist extremism, 
the more likely they are to take action against Islamist extremism. 
 
Methodology and Data 
This study combines a deductive and inductive research strategy to investigate the motivations of 
British Muslims to counter-extremism. The deductive approach is employed when testing the 
formulated hypotheses using survey data of British Muslims, while a more inductive approach is 
applied to the qualitative data from the survey’s open-ended question and interviews with British 
Muslim counter-extremism activists.  
 
Representative survey with British Muslims 
The survey data was collected between December 2017 and January 2018 by the survey company 
Qualtrics. The survey included an experimental component, which is reported elsewhere.30 The 
variables reported on here were not affected by the experimental manipulation. The respondents were 
self-identified Muslims living in the United Kingdom and the final sample (n = 825) was 
representative of the UK Muslim population in terms of gender (men = 430, women = 395), age and 
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education (although the age groups above 55 were slightly underrepresented and the sample was 
slightly overrepresented on the graduate and postgraduate levels).   
 
Measures 
Intention to take counter-extremism action. The respondents were presented a short scenario in which 
they were asked to imagine that a terrorist attack occurred and that the perpetrators were British 
Muslim. The dependent variable was measured on a 7-point Likert scale from extremely unlikely to 
extremely likely in response to the question: Provided you had the opportunity, how likely is it that 
you would take any of these actions in response to the attack? The actions were: signing a petition, 
donating to counter-extremism organizations, joining a march against extremism, opposing 
extremists on the social media, opposing extremists in face-to-face discussions and physically 
preventing them from staging public events. An index of the intention to take counter-extremism 
action was constructed out of these six items (α = .85) with a mean of .67 (SD = .22). This and all 
other measures below were scored on a scale from 0 to 1. 
Identity. An index was constructed measuring Muslim identity strength based on three items on a 
7-point Likert scale that correspond to Cameron’s (2004) three aspects of social identity: in-group 
ties (I feel strong ties to other Muslims), in-group affect (In general I am glad to be a Muslim) and 
cognitive centrality (Being a Muslim is an important part of my self-image). The index showed good 
reliability (α = .88), with a mean score of .78 (SD = .24). 
Group efficacy. An index was constructed measuring the perception of group efficacy based on 
three items (α = .78) on a 7-point Likert scale, following Honsey et al.31 observation that people judge 
the effectiveness of collective action by different criteria: reaching the overall desired goal of the 
action (As Muslims, I think we can help to reduce the level of Islamist extremism in the UK), 
influencing third parties (As Muslims, I think we can prove to the rest of society that Muslim 
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communities in the UK do not support Islamist extremism) and building a movement (As Muslims, I 
think we can inspire fellow Muslims in the UK to become involved in countering Islamist extremism). 
The index had a mean of .78 (SD = .21). 
Emotions. Four emotions in response to Islamist extremism were measured, each by a single item 
on a 7-point Likert scale (Islamist extremists make me feel angry/guilty/ashamed/afraid). Mean scores 
and standard deviations were .79 (.24), .47 (.33), .66 (.33), and .67 (.30) respectively.  
Moral obligation. An index was constructed measuring felt moral obligation to act against Islamist 
extremism based on two items (α = .85) on a 7-point Likert-scale (I feel a sense of moral duty to take 
action against Islamist extremism; I feel a sense of religious duty to take action against Islamist 
extremism). The mean score for the combined index was .73 for (SD = .22). 
Apart from the main dependent and independent variables, a number of control variables were 
measured: age, gender, education, place of birth (in/outside of the UK) and past protest experience. 
The last variable was constructed by listing fourteen forms of political activism (ranging from liking 
a Facebook group to fighting with police or rival demonstrators, in randomized order) and asking the 
respondents to indicate for each whether they have done it in the past twelve months. A simple 
formative index of past experience in political activism was created by adding up responses. Since it 
is commonly assumed that at the heart of collective action there are grievances,32 I included an item 
that measured the extent of grievances vis-à-vis Islamist extremism on a 7-point Likert-scale (Islamist 
extremism is a serious problem in the UK). The variable had a mean of .65 (SD = .28). 
The survey also included an open-ended question that was posed to the respondents after they 
indicated their likelihood to join a specific counter-extremism demonstration (the dependent measure 
of the experimental component of the study). This question simply asked the respondents about the 
reason for their answer. I have analyzed the reasons given by those respondents who were slightly, 
moderately and extremely likely to participate (n = 495). Their written replies were sorted using two 
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rounds of coding in Microsoft Excel. In the first round, I applied open coding, using labels that 
summarized respondents’ replies about reasons for engagement.33 In the second round of coding, I 
grouped together those open codes that expressed the same core reason (see Table A1 in the Appendix 
for the coding frame).  
 
Interviews with British Muslim counter-extremism activists 
I conducted 30 semi-structured interviews with British Muslims counter-extremism activists (18 men 
and 12 women), whose age span from early 20s to late 60s, with an average of around 40 years.  The 
interviews lasted an hour on average and took place in various areas of England (mainly in London, 
Birmingham and Manchester) in October and November 2017. Eight of the interviews were 
conducted remotely over a video chat application, while the rest was conducted face to face. Part of 
the interviewees were identified with the use of the British media reports and with the help of existing 
prior contacts of the author. Additional interviewees were identified through a snow-ball method by 
asking interviewees to recommend further contacts.  
In line with the abovementioned definition of British Muslim counter-extremism activists, the 
interviewees covered a wide range of activism. Some were primarily engaged in inter-faith and 
cohesion work, where counter-extremism was included only as one of many other activities. Some 
work with vulnerable people, for example with drug addicts or troubled youth, and address extremism 
as another threat these people face. Others are focused on religious education and engage in activities 
against Islamist extremism as a part of their efforts to promote “true” Islam among Muslims and non-
Muslims. The interviewees were either volunteers in their activism, semi-paid or full-time paid 
professionals. Some of them worked for the government at some point in their careers and four of 
them were former activists who worked for the government at the time of the interviews. 
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The interviews flexibly followed a structure that consisted of questions about the activists’ 
background, the first time they encountered Islamist extremism, their motivation for countering it 
(with follow-up questions probing emotions and perception of group efficacy), major challenges to 
their activism, their assessment of the government counter-extremism policy and their assessment of 
other Muslim counter-extremism activists or organizations. All interviews were transcribed and 
coded using the software package NVivo. As in the case of the qualitative survey data, two rounds of 
coding were applied. First, using a closed coding strategy,34 a priori meta-codes consisting of the four 
core motivations for collective action were created. Subsequently, relevant sentences or paragraphs 
from the interview transcripts were assigned to one of the four meta-codes. In the second round of 
coding, I grouped these excerpts together to create more specific sub-categories within the meta-
codes. For example, sub-categories protecting women and protecting vulnerable Muslims were 
created within the meta-code identity motivation. I then re-read all sub-categories of the meta-codes 
and arrived at four final labels covering the most frequent reasons given as a motivation for long-term 
counter-extremism activism (see Table A2 in the Appendix for the coding frame). 
 
Results 
The likelihood and types of counter-extremism engagement 
The survey data indicates that the likelihood of British Muslims taking action against Islamist 
extremism is high. Although this might be a product of social desirability bias or simply driven by 
the low-cost low-risk category of “signing a petition”, it nevertheless casts doubt on the dominant 
narrative of Muslim alienation and reluctance to stand up against Islamist extremism. Over 90% (n = 
745) of the survey respondents indicate to be slightly, moderately or extremely likely to take at least 
one of the six types of action against Islamist extremism in response to the terrorist attack (see Table 
1). Around 5% (n = 42) indicated that they were “neither likely nor unlikely” to take any action. 
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Almost one third of the respondents (29%, n = 239) were slightly, moderately or extremely likely to 
engage in all of the six actions. Concerning the different forms of action, the respondents were 
unsurprisingly more likely to engage in low-cost and low-risk actions like signing a petition or 
debating extremists on-line than donating money for the cause or physically preventing extremists 
from staging public events. This is in line with existing scholarship on activism.35 What stands out, 
however, is the reluctance to take part in a public march against Islamist extremism, which might 
partially explain the lack of “visible” collective street actions by Muslims against Islamist extremism, 
sometimes criticized by sections of the majority society. Female respondents especially were less 
likely to participate in a march.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
The role of identity, efficacy, anger and moral obligation in motivating counter-extremism activism 
In order to test the formulated hypotheses, I ran two multiple linear regressions. The first regression, 
presented in Table 2, shows the relationship between the four hypothesized motivations and the index 
of counter-extremism behavioral intentions. In the second regression, presented in Table 3, I 
disaggregated the index into the six specific types of action. Below, I discuss the results from the 
regressions and complement them with findings from the open-ended survey question (Figure 1) and 
the interviews. 
Table 2 and Table 3 about here 
Identity 
When it comes to identity, measured as the strength of identification with Muslims, there is no 
statistically significant effect on taking counter-extremism action in any of the regressions (Table 2 
and Table 3). Therefore, we do not find support for hypothesis H1a. On the other hand, Table 2 shows 
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that identity in terms of identification with Muslims who counter Islamist extremism has a positive 
coefficient, which is statistically significant (although only at p < 0.1). Similarly, this measure of 
identity has a positive and statistically significant relationship with two out of the six types of counter-
extremism action (Table 3). This lends some support to hypothesis H1b. Those respondents who 
strongly identified with Muslims engaged in counter-extremism were statistically more likely to be 
men, highly educated, strongly identifying themselves as Muslims, perceiving Islamist extremism as 
a major problem, feeling efficacious and having past experience in protesting.  
These findings are in line with research that holds that the strength of politicized identity36 or 
opinion-based group identity37 is a better predictor of engagement in collective action than 
identification with broad social categories. Broad categories of identification are usually employed in 
studies of political and social protests, which are usually about ingroup-outgroup conflicts, where the 
disadvantaged ingroup (e.g., workers, students or ethnic minorities) fights for equality and justice. 
McGarty et al.38 argue that in the real world there are often deep divisions within disadvantaged 
groups that cannot be captured by such an approach. Our case of British Muslims can be regarded as 
a case of infighting within one such group. This does not necessarily imply that there is an open 
conflict between Muslims who support extremism and those who do not. Rather, it is likely that the 
missing relationship between Muslim identity and the willingness to engage in counter-extremism 
reflects, among other things, strong suspicions about and contestation of counter-extremism policies, 
which some Muslims feel are discriminatory and stigmatizing.39  
Yet, identity seems to play an important role for taking counter-extremism action, despite the fact 
that it does not have predictive statistical power. In Figure 1, I categorized the reasons for participating 
in a demonstration against Islamist extremism after a hypothetical terrorist attack, which were given 
by the survey respondents. Reasons are not the same as motivations and so getting at the underlying 
motives behind some of the answers can be challenging. Nevertheless, I argue that linked to the 
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identity motivation is the category Distancing from extremists. This category captures the desire to 
protect the image, and thus the status, of the respondent and his or her social group, i.e., Muslims. An 
example of this category is the following answer: “To show I am the definition of a Muslim, and they 
are not.” Supporting the country and fellow citizens is another category related to identity motivation. 
Here, the respondents emphasized their belonging to the UK and the British society and the 
corresponding need to protect both from the threat of extremism. Identity motivation is also likely 
behind the need to demonstrate Muslim unity captured by the category of the same name. Finally, the 
category Helping or protecting Islam or Muslims straddles both identity and moral motivations, 
because the responses express concern for either Muslims or Islam, but it is unclear if the concern 
stems from the threat to the status of the group (related to identity) or violation of deeply held values 
(related to moral obligation). 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Issues of identity also appeared in the interviews with Muslim counter-extremism activists. In 
these interviews, I have identified four motivational themes in total. Protecting vulnerable Muslims, 
was the second most frequent theme and it expressed the need to protect vulnerable people, especially 
Muslim women and youth. Although activists expressed concerns about the negative impact of 
Islamist extremism on the status of all Muslims, it seems that identifying with particular sub-groups 
within the Muslim communities was particularly motivating to a number of activist for their counter-
extremism engagement. For example, three women activists (I13, I21, I26) emphasized the need to 
protect girls and other women from experiencing overly conservative or isolationist tendencies in 
their communities. These concerns often stemmed from their own experience, projected on the next 
generation: 
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I know so many people that privately have so many doubts, feel restricted, especially 
women, but they can’t, they can’t say anything, they feel scared, they don’t want to be 
tarnished. … I don’t want people to feel bad, I don’t want people to feel less, that’s why 
I do this for my daughter, I don’t want her to grow up feeling completely minimized like 
I did. (I13) 
 
Another group of activists expressing strong motivation to protect vulnerable Muslims were those 
who had been engaged in different forms of helping activism, like supporting drug addicts or 
delinquent youth. It was often the case that these activists had been themselves in the shoes of the 
people they were now trying to help and they felt a duty to “give back”. They would approach counter-
extremism as a safeguarding issue, in addition to other risks that vulnerable Muslims face: 
 
This is for me my passion and my calling, working with young people … it is based on 
my personal experience. As I have mentioned, I grew up with all these issues: racism, 
feeling self-harm, isolation, feeling not integrated in society, not having belonging. So 
for me, I’m driven by purpose. I see young people in particular, making the same mistakes 
… we need to connect and we need to reach out. We need to be there for them. (I28) 
 
The protective motivation also developed as a reaction to far-right extremism and racism. Seven 
interviewees emphasized traumatizing encounters with racism as a motivation to protect other victims 
of racism, with whom they identify, from following the self-destructive path of radicalization:  
 
I just can't allow the next generation to feel the way that I did. … I just feel like these 
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people are in a tough situation and I understand their pain. … If I didn't suffer racism as 
a young guy and see people banged up and throw their lives away — I think [that] 
motivated me more than anything else. (I5) 
 
Another interview theme, Correcting the reputation of Muslims, captures the need to distance 
“normal” Muslims from the extremists: “[W]e as a Muslim community are trying to disassociate 
ourselves from ISIS, because ISIS is something – is a terror that we really don’t want to be linked 
with (I11).” A different interviewee used the word “friend” to denote Islam or Muslim communities 
in an allegory meant to explain the felt obligation to act: “If you have a friend who people think is 
bad and they are talking bad around his back, you have to give the true side of this person (I29).” The 
need to exonerate one’s identity is both inward and outward oriented. “[A]s a Muslim you don’t want 
people to fear Muslims” (I29) is a practical concern regarding becoming a member of a suspect 
community. The inward oriented, more psychological concern has to do with defending social identity 
in one’s own eyes: “So if these people [extremists] are thinking that the religion is only about killings 
and shedding blood … if this is the true Islam, so why I am Muslim now (I29)?”  
The need to set the record straight was typical of those active on the soft end of counter-extremism 
(i.e., activities dominated by education, cohesion and inter-faith work). Particularly veiled women, as 
visible Muslims, and members of Islamic minority communities like the Shias or Ahmadis, felt the 
need to cleanse their Muslim identity from the stain of extremism.  
 
Group efficacy 
Moving on to the perception of efficacy as a motivation for counter-extremism, Table 2 shows a 
positive and statistically significant relationship with the likelihood of taking action against Islamist 
extremism. What was measured in the survey was group efficacy and accordingly, Table 3 shows 
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that group efficacy is not statistically significant (or only marginally in case of physical confrontation) 
when it comes to individualistic actions, like confronting extremists on social media or face to face. 
Other types of action that imply more of a group effort have positive and statistically significant 
relationship with group efficacy, which together with the result from Table 1 supports hypothesis H2. 
Those respondents who perceived high group efficacy were statistically more likely to be men, born 
outside of the UK, feeling strongly morally obliged to act, score high on all four emotions and on 
both measures of identity. Past protest experience was not correlated with group efficacy.   
Turning to the data from the open-ended survey question (Figure 1), the category Instrumental 
reasoning cover replies that focus on the specific outcome of the action, for example sending a 
message to the extremists or stopping terrorism. It is likely that the motivation behind taking action 
in such a goal-oriented approach has to do with felt group efficacy – the perception that it will matter. 
Admittedly, efficacy, rather than identity, can be the dominant motivation behind the category 
Distancing from extremists. It may therefore be that two British Muslims who want to distance from 
extremists and who identify equally strongly with their Muslim identity would differ in their 
participation on the basis of their perception of whether a demonstration against extremism can 
achieve (or contribute to) the goal of distancing.    
All interviewed activists felt efficacious in what they were doing. Some of them even emphasized 
their skills as a motivation for getting involved. I named this motivational theme Applying and 
improving skills. Self-efficacy, rather than group efficacy, comes to the fore here. These activists 
would stress their unique skills to tackle extremism and a greater understanding of the issue than the 
average person has. This is typical of former extremists who are providing intervention work: “So, I 
do know radicals. I do know their mindset and how they’re thinking, how they get into that stage, as 
well as, I know how important it is actually to counter that. Especially, if you know their thinking 
(I22).” Motivation through knowledge applies also to activists who gained a lot of experience dealing 
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with radicalized Muslims: “I have a pretty good understanding on this and this is what drives me now 
because there's no one left [who truly understands the issue and takes a politically balanced position] 
(I5).” They would be mostly engaged in pure counter-extremism work (as opposed to social cohesion 
or inter-faith dialogues) and regard it as a profession that only a handful skilled practitioners can and 
should be doing: “I did it because it’s a challenge, mentally. And I did it because it was a job, which 
used my skills (I20).” 
 
Anger 
When it comes to anger as an emotional motivation, Table 2 shows a positive and statistically 
significant relationship with the likelihood of taking action. Disaggregating different types of action, 
anger has a positive and statistically significant relationship with all of them, except for marching and 
physical confrontation. These two types of action are the least popular and it is possible that feeling 
angry is not enough to overcome the unwillingness to resort to them. Overall, however, I find support 
for hypothesis H3. Those who felt angry were statistically more likely to feel afraid and ashamed, but 
less likely to feel guilty and have past protest experience. They tended to be born in the UK and score 
high on feeling morally obliged to act and on perceived group efficacy.  
Interestingly, the regressions show that other emotions, namely guilt and fear, have positive and 
statistically significant relationship with taking action. Fear is often thought of as a paralyzing action 
inhibiting emotion. However, Table 2 indicates that fear can stimulate those types of actions that 
avoid physical and virtual contact with the feared adversary (e.g., signing a petition or donating 
money). When it comes to guilt, a possible explanation is that this emotion might induce action as an 
ego protective measure with the purpose of soothing one’s negative feelings.40 
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Anger showed up in the open-ended survey question too (Figure 1). Here, I coded replies as anger 
whenever respondents explained their intention to take action solely with invectives addressed to 
extremists. A (mild) example of what typically were very short answers is: “Because I hate terrorists.”  
The majority of activists that I interviewed expressed strong negative feelings about extremists. 
While these feelings would flare up in the form of anger and moral outrage in the aftermath of terrorist 
attacks, sometimes prompting organization of or participation in one-off action like anti-violence 
vigils, anger did not seem to sustain long-term activism. In fact, six activists (I3, I9, I10, I17, I12, 
I20) said they did not feel anger, but rather sadness (sometimes combined with shame). Two ex-
extremists felt guilt (I8, I22) and one activists said he was feeling already “numb”. He also summed 
up the likely effect of emotions by describing them as reactive, while he, as an activist, wanted to be 
pro-active (I1). Such accounts fit well into the distinction between reactive and, more stable and 
longer lasting, affective emotions,41 where anger belongs to the former category, while hatred, 
hostility or loathing fall on the affective end of the emotional continuum. 
 
Moral obligation 
Moral obligation has a positive and statistically significant relationship with both the index of 
counter-extremism behavior (Table 2) and all the separate six types of action (Table 3). This supports 
the last hypothesis H4. The standardized beta coefficients for moral obligation, group efficacy and 
anger are .28, .13 and .14, respectively, which suggests that it is the strongest motivation for taking 
action against Islamist extremism. Those scoring high on moral obligation to act against Islamist 
extremism were statistically more likely to perceive high group efficacy, feel angry, have past 
experience with protest and identify strongly as Muslims. 
That moral obligation to act is the strongest motivation for British Muslims to act against Islamist 
extremism is also reflected in the most frequent category of the responses to the open-ended survey 
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question – Expressing own values and rejecting extremism. An example of such a response is the 
following quote: “I feel morally obligated to fight against people who pose a threat to my life and 
way of living. They also conduct multiple cruel and unfair practices which I feel that they should not 
be allowed to.” Religious reasoning is equally about moral values. This category applies to all 
responses that referred explicitly to religious duty or paraphrased religious sources about obligation 
to forbid evil. Together, these two categories make up about one third of all reasons given for taking 
action against Islamist extremism.  
The most frequent motivational theme that came out from the interviews with counter-extremism 
activists confirms the importance of moral obligation to act. This theme was coded Protecting and 
fulfilling religious and humanist values and captures two types of moral obligation. One is explicitly 
linked to religious duty, while the other was expressed in non-religious language of humanism and 
human rights. Starting with the former, over half of the interviewees said they were motivated to 
counter Islamist extremism because their Islamic values compelled them to do so. One typical 
example: 
 
I’m doing it not because the government says so, but because I understand this as the best 
way to serve my faith. … I’m seeking my salvation … so everything I’m doing with the 
Home Office, counter-radicalization, or talking with these Islamists, is my way of being 
a dutiful slave of God. (I17) 
 
Interviewees who stressed religious values frequently referred to passages of the Quran and 
ahaadeeth (the examples of the Prophet) that deplore taking innocent lives and command to right 
wrong and challenge evil. They would regard their activism as a “wajib” (duty), believing that Islam 
is a religion that requires social action against injustice. 
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Quran, basically, is the best guidance you can get. And, if you read it, you can’t stop 
yourself from stopping the wrong. Stopping the wrong, if a wrong is happening, innocent 
people are dying here, there, everywhere. … These people are dying because of 
extremism. Extremism which Muslims can’t say is not present in Muslim societies. It is. 
And, sometimes the things they say, are so inhumane, if you are reader of Quran you can’t 
even stop yourself from stopping them. (I6) 
 
Activists who instead stressed humanistic values would talk about “injustice”, “human rights” or 
broader, universal, ethics and morality. This attitude is exemplified in the following quote:  
 
I wouldn’t describe it as an Islamic religious duty. I would say it’s a — you know, for 
example, when I walk past somebody who is sleeping on the street, I feel a sense of “we 
should be able to do something about this” … So, I feel a moral responsibility towards 
that. (I8) 
 
Although the quote above makes an explicit distinction between a religious duty and a moral 
dimension beyond religion, most of those who used the religious framework understood Islamic 
values as fully encompassing “secular” humanistic ones. Therefore, in their minds, there was no 
difference between British values or universal values and Islamic values.  
 
Conclusion 
Western governments, the media and publics increasingly encourage and demand Muslims to 
challenge Islamist extremism. However, both academic and public discourse suggests that Muslims 
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deeply resent counter-terrorism policies, which allegedly results in Muslim alienation and reluctance 
to engage in counter-extremism. This article investigated motivation for counter-extremism 
engagement of British Muslims in spite of such alienation, using a social-psychological framework 
of collective action motivation. The findings inform policies aiming at mobilizing Muslims against 
Islamist extremism in the following way. 
The strongest motivation of British Muslims to take both one-off and long-term action against 
Islamist extremism is the moral obligation to act. This is understandable given that extremism is an 
issue heavily loaded with values and so collective action against extremism would likely be what 
Turner and Killian42 called a value-oriented action. Policy makers should, thus, systematically and 
strongly support communication campaigns and civil society organizations that stress how 
specifically Islamist extremism and terrorism violate Islamic values, principles and norms and how 
these principles correspond to universal human values that need to be defended. Where involved 
directly, Western governments should communicate this message in a self-critical way to avoid 
charges of hypocrisy and double-standards. 
Policy makers can also increase Muslim participation in actions against Islamist extremism by 
strengthening the motivational dimension of perceived efficacy. For a start, this can be done by clearly 
communicating what type of actions, precisely, can be taken and how. Positive effects of one-off 
actions by regular Muslims, such as inspirational confrontations with extremists captured on social 
media or police tip-offs leading to successful safe-guarding of young and vulnerable Muslims from 
extremism, should be publicized. The work and positive impact of Muslim counter-extremism 
activists engaged over the long term should also be highlighted. These activists usually have high 
perception of efficacy, but they too often complain about insufficient material and moral support from 
the government. Such support was sought only on more equal terms and with less restrictive caveats 
attached to it, which indicates that policy makers should re-double their efforts to build more trusting, 
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democratic, transparent and inclusive relationship with various Muslim communities and 
organizations. 
The insight from the analysis pertaining to identity motivation can help policy makers to magnify 
the impact of some of the recommendations above. Violation of Islamic and universal values by 
Islamist extremists can particularly reverberate among Muslim communities if it is related to the 
negative effects on certain groups of Muslims, such as women and young people. Similarly, examples 
of successful Muslim interventions can be made more powerful by illustrating their positive effect on 
these groups. Since identification with Muslim counter-extremism activists proved to predict 
engagement, policy makers should promote the personal stories of activists who can serve as role 
models. 
Most, if not all, of these recommendations would stir some emotions among Muslims. It is likely 
that highlighting how Islamist extremism violates Islamic and universal values and how it negatively 
effects the lives of Muslims, especially certain groups of Muslims, will further magnify the overall 
motivation to take action. However, for ethical reasons and due to the high risk of backfire, policy 
makers should not attempt to manipulate emotions like guilt or fear to increase Muslim engagement 
in counter-extremism.   
One limitation of this study is its relative silence regarding potential barriers to taking part in 
counter-extremism. Obviously, it is not only important to study what motivates Muslims to 
engagement, but also what hinders them from engaging. The data I collected on this all point in one 
direction. Some of the biggest obstacles to engagement are the perception of unfair responsibilisation 
for Islamist extremism, the lack of efficacy and fear. The first obstacle alone opens a debate about 
the potential counter-productiveness of counter-terrorism policies and qualifies the recommendation 
to policy makers made above by noting that putting exclusive responsibility on Muslims can backfire. 
The barriers to Muslim-based counter-extremism is therefore a promising topic for further research. 
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Another limitation and a potential area for further research is the mutual relationship between the 
different motivations to counter-extremism. For example, there could be a link between moral 
obligation and perceived group efficacy to the effect that strongly felt moral obligation to act inflates 
the perception of the action’s effectiveness. A related move beyond correlational study would entail 
the deployment of experimental designs that could ascertain the causal link between different 
motivations and engagement in counter-extremism. 
The study showed a high level of readiness by British Muslim to engage in various counter-
extremism actions, including high-risk actions such as physical confrontations. Since there is only a 
limited number of paid Muslim counter-extremism activists, who are unlikely to be among the survey 
respondents, and even if we discount the potential social desirability bias, this calls into question the 
dominant narrative of Muslim alienation, at least when it comes to willingness to cooperate in 
counter-terrorism policies. Future studies should scrutinize the alienation narrative in order to paint a 
more nuanced picture of the extent of Muslim resentment and its alleged effect on cooperation in the 
area of counter-terrorism. This also opens up an avenue for more theoretically guided research into 
the ways Muslims can (and demonstrably do) overcome the risks, the lack of selective incentives and 
the free rider problem linked to collective action against Islamist extremism.    
A final note on the generalizability of the results. The context in which British Muslims find 
themselves is in many ways similar to the situation facing other minority Muslim communities in the 
Western countries. One variable that could vary more substantially depending on the national context 
is the perceived group efficacy. The UK has a strong culture of collective action and 
communitarianism, which might affect the assessment of the likelihood that collective action can 
reach its desired goal, in contrast to countries with weaker civil society and socio-politically 
marginalized minorities. In principle, the findings should be also generalizable to non-Muslim 
counter-extremism activism, with the same caveat on perceived group efficacy. As already 
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mentioned, extremism is an issue primarily about values and emotions that result from the violation 
of values. Apart from perceived efficacy, the another potential difference might lie in identity 
motivation, depending whether the conflict lines run within the ingroup or between groups, 
understood in terms of broad social categories. 
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I28: Male, a director of a counter-radicalization organization, WhatsApp interview – Birmingham, 
7.11.2017. 
I29: Female, a member of a counter-extremism organization, London, 8.11.2017. 
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Table 1: Means and percentages of the likelihood to engage in six types of action against Islamist 
extremism (7-point Likert scale). 
 
  
Petition 
against 
extremis
m 
Donation 
to 
counter-
extremism 
Opposing 
extremists 
on social 
media 
Marching 
against 
extremism 
Discussing 
extremists 
face to 
face 
Physically 
confronting 
extremists   
Mean 5.7 4.9 5.2 4.8 5.1 4.4 
        
Extremely / 
moderately 
unlikely  
5 (43) 10 (83) 9 (76) 11 (91) 10 (76) 18 (146) 
       
Slightly unlikely 2 (15) 6 (51) 4 (34) 6 (46) 5 (38) 8 (66) 
       
Neither likely nor 
unlikely 
13 (109) 23 (188) 20 (165) 25 (203) 19 (160) 30 (245) 
       
Slightly likely 15 (120) 17 (142) 16 (129) 20 (166) 18 (150) 12 (97) 
       
Moderately / 
extremely likely 
65 (538) 44 (361) 51 (421) 38 (319) 48 (401) 33 (271) 
 
      
        
Total 100 (825) 100 (825) 100 (825) 100 (825) 100 (825) 100 (825) 
Number of observations are in brackets. Percentages are in front of the brackets.  
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Table 2: Direct effect of motivational factors on the likelihood to engage in action against 
Islamist extremism, controlled for biographical factors, past protest experience and grievances. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Age (base=18-24)      
25 - 34 -.036* -.038* -.035* -.038** -.036* 
 (.020) (.019) (.018) (.017) (.020) 
35 - 44 -.034* -.036* -.036* -.039** -.036** 
 (.021) (.021) (.020) (.018) (.018) 
45 - 84 -.031 -.030 -.029 -.035 -.038* 
 (.025) (.025) (.024) (.023) (.022) 
Gender (base=male)      
Female -.006 -.003 .006 -.005 .001 
 (.015) (.015) (.014) (.013) (.013) 
Education (base=no or 
secondary) 
     
Post-secondary/vocational  -.075*** -.076*** -.064*** -.054*** -.045** 
 (.023) (.023) (.021) (.020) (.020) 
University degree -.026 -.034 -.033* -.032* -.027 
 (.021) (.021) (.020) (.019) (.018) 
Place of birth (base=born in 
the UK) 
     
Not born in the UK .041** .044*** .032** .024* .025* 
 (.016) (.016) (.015) (.015) (.014) 
Past protest experience .027*** .024*** .024*** .022*** .020*** 
 (.005) (.005) (.005) (.004) (.004) 
Grievances .140*** .123*** .086*** .032 .027 
 (.026) (.026) (.025) (.024) (.023) 
Identity (Muslim)  .087*** .008 .027 -.006 
  (.030) (.030) (.028) (.028) 
Identity (Muslim C-E 
activists) 
 .072*** .042* .041* .034* 
  (.024) (.022) (.021) (.021) 
Group efficacy   .343*** .236*** .127*** 
   (.035) (.035) (.037) 
Anger    .181*** .132*** 
    (.032) (.031) 
Shame    -.007 -.008 
    (.026) (.025) 
Guilt    .106*** .096*** 
    (.024) (.024) 
Fear    .068** .061** 
    (.027) (.026) 
Moral obligation     .267*** 
     (.035) 
Constant .599*** .510*** .351*** .225*** .186*** 
 (.030) (.037) (.039) (.039) (.038) 
Observations 825 825 825 825 825 
Adjusted R2 .086 .106 .199 .284 .331 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3: Direct effect of motivational factors on the likelihood to engage in six different types 
of action against Islamist extremism, controlled for age, education, place of birth and past 
protest experience. 
 Petition 
against 
extremism  
Donation to 
counter-
extremism  
Opposing 
extremists 
on social 
media  
Marching 
against 
extremism  
Discussing 
extremists 
face to face  
Physically 
confronting 
extremists  
Age (base=18-24)       
25 - 34 -.008 -.008 -.063*** -.036 -.041* -.060** 
 (.021) (.024) (.024) (.025) (.025) (.026) 
35 - 44 .023 -.030 -.084*** -.016 -.062** -.048* 
 (.023) (.025) (.025) (.026) (.026) (.027) 
45 - 84 .009 -.059* -.079** -.006 -.026 -.071** 
 (.028) (.031) (.031) (.032) (.032) (.033) 
Education (base=no or 
secondary) 
      
Post-
secondary/vocational 
-.003 -.071*** -.032 -.055* -.028 -.076** 
 (.025) (.027) (.028) (.029) (.029) (.030) 
University degree -.009 -.052** -.023 -.040 .016 -.051* 
 (.023) (.026) (.026) (.027) (.027) (.028) 
Place of birth 
(base=born in the UK) 
      
Not born in the UK .009 .012 .028 .033 .013 .058*** 
 (.018) (.020) (.020) (.021) (.021) (.022) 
Past protest experience .008 .014** .026*** .032*** .014** .027*** 
 (.005) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) 
Grievances .080*** .003 .077** -.004 -.027 .029 
 (.029) (.032) (.033) (.034) (.034) (.035) 
Identity (Muslim) -.027 .016 -.021 .006 -.000 -.009 
 (.035) (.039) (.039) (.040) (.041) (.042) 
Identity (Muslim C-E 
activists) 
.023 .101*** .029 .030 .069** -.044 
 (.026) (.029) (.029) (.030) (.030) (.031) 
Group efficacy .196*** .082 .210*** .123** .037 .108* 
 (.046) (.051) (.052) (.053) (.054) (.056) 
Anger .212*** .275*** .097** .024 .193*** -.023 
 (.039) (.043) (.043) (.045) (.045) (.047) 
Guilt -.007 .096*** .085*** .102*** .043 .241*** 
 (.027) (.030) (.030) (.031) (.031) (.033) 
Fear .101*** .045 .136*** .079** .037 -.040 
 (.032) (.035) (.035) (.036) (.037) (.038) 
Moral obligation .155*** .281*** .163*** .315*** .306*** .379*** 
 (.044) (.049) (.049) (.051) (.051) (.053) 
       
Constant .241*** .114** .157*** .181*** .229*** .190*** 
 (.048) (.053) (.053) (.055) (.055) (.057) 
Observations 825 825 825 825 825 825 
Adjusted R2 .216 .261 .224 .197 .167 .224 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Figure 1. Reasons given for participation in a demonstration against Islamist extremism 
  
9 
 
Appendix 
Table A1: Coding frame for the open-ended survey question about the reasons to participate in a 
demonstration against Islamist extremism 
Main code  Sub-codes (open coding) Description 
Expressing own values and 
rejecting extremism 
Standing for one’s values 
Being against extremism 
Standing up for justice 
Duty as a human/citizen 
Emphasis on the rejection of 
extremism and upholding of 
different values, principles and 
norms. 
Distancing from extremists Muslims are not extremists 
Islam is religion of good 
  
Emphasis on rejecting the link 
between extremism and 
Muslims or Islam. 
Instrumental reasoning Stopping extremism 
Sending message to extremists 
Protecting/helping people 
Educating Muslims and others 
about true Islam 
 
Emphasis on the result of the 
engagement in terms of 
achieving a specific outcome. 
Supporting the country and 
fellow citizens 
Showing solidarity and unity 
with Britain 
Supporting fellow citizens 
Emphasis on the need to 
protect/advance the country 
and fellow citizens. 
Helping or protecting Islam or 
Muslims 
Protecting Islam 
Protecting Muslims 
Emphasis on the need to 
protect Islam or Muslims. 
Religious reasoning Extremism is against Islam 
Feeling religious duty 
Emphasis on the religion 
either in terms of 
incompatibility with 
extremism or as an explicit 
religious duty to engage. 
Supporting the organizer Supporting government actions 
Supporting MCB 
Emphasis on the need to 
support the organizer of the 
demonstration. 
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Demonstrating Muslim unity Advancing Muslim 
unity/community 
Emphasis on the need to 
demonstrate Muslims’ unity. 
Anger and hate Hating extremists 
Angry with extremism 
Emphasis on the emotions felt 
towards extremism or 
extremists. 
 
Table A2: Coding frame for interviews with Muslim counter-extremism activists (only codes 
pertaining to motivations for engagement) 
Meta codes  
(closed coding) 
Sub-categories Final label  
(most frequent reasons for 
long-term engagement) 
Identity motivation 
Protecting women 
Protecting vulnerable youth 
Protecting all people 
Protecting vulnerable 
Muslims 
Duty to clean reputation of Muslims 
Need to disassociate Muslims from 
extremism 
Correcting the reputation of 
Muslims 
Efficacy motivation 
 
Learning and applying skills 
Satisfaction from success 
Having smaller realistic goals 
Applying and improving 
skills 
Morality 
motivation 
Duty as a Muslim 
Moral duty expressed non-religiously 
Protecting and fulfilling 
religious and humanist values 
Emotional 
motivation 
Anger 
Sadness 
No feelings 
Shame 
Guilt and responsibility 
- no reason identified 
as important in this 
meta-code   
 
 
 
 
